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POLITICAL REDISTRICTING IN THE POST-RUCHO ERA
Robert Fisch1
INTRODUCTION
In January of 2011, the infamous “Snake by the Lake” was born.2 Stretching along the
southern coast of Lake Erie, the 9th Congressional District of Ohio covers a 120 mile-long thin
strip of the state.3 The district is less than one mile wide at certain locations and is considered
contiguous, a state constitutional requirement for congressional districts,4 only because the
“snake” passes through portions of Lake Erie.5 In creating the district, the Ohio Republican
Party, the majority party in the state legislature at the time, drew the boundaries with the intent to
limit the voting power of the Democrats in the congressional districts in northern Ohio, a process
also known as political gerrymandering.6 As a result, in the 2012 election, Republicans won
twelve of Ohio’s sixteen congressional districts, including wins in two congressional districts
previously represented by Democrats.7
Unfortunately, the actions in Ohio reflect a common practice in the United States. As
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia commented, “[p]olitical gerrymanders are not new to
the American scene.”8 In fact, allegations of gerrymandering have occurred as far back in
American history as the 18th century.9 However, due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling
in Rucho v. Common Cause, cases involving political gerrymandering can no longer be
challenged in federal courts. In Rucho, the Supreme Court held that matters concerning political
gerrymandering are outside of the scope of federal courts.10 While the Court may have limited
the federal judiciary’s ability to resolve political gerrymandering issues, it also provided three
suggestions for alternative mea
1
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ns to resolve political gerrymandering: (1) the passage of a congressional bill that would
grant federal courts the ability to hear gerrymandering claims; (2) state constitutional
amendments prohibiting gerrymandering; and (3) independent commissions charged with
drawing congressional district maps.11 Of these alternatives, the use of independent commissions
is the only viable option. The process by which such commissions are created, how members are
selected, and the process followed by these commissions to conduct redistricting makes the use
of state redistricting commissions to advise state legislatures the most realistic way to conduct
redistricting in the U.S. without gerrymandering taking place.
The first section of this paper will present an overview of gerrymandering and the
techniques states use when conducting it. The second section will look at the U.S. Supreme
Court case Rucho v. Common Cause and the Court’s analysis. The third section will analyze
three solutions to redistricting problems suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, this paper
will look at elements of independent commissions that can create an ideal solution to the
problem of political gerrymandering in the U.S.
Background on Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering is the practice of manipulating the boundaries of an electoral district
with the intent to favor a particular group of people.12 Gerrymandering claims arise when a map
is redrawn with boundaries that do not align with traditional map-drawing criteria such as
geographical fairness, contiguity, and cohesiveness of municipalities.13 Gerrymandering most
often occurs with the redrawing of district maps following the completion of the U.S. Census.14
Every ten years, during the census, the U.S. Census Bureau collects population information on
all individuals living in the U.S., which it in turn sends to the states.15 The individual states then
use that data to redraw their district maps accordingly.16 While it is required that congressional
district maps must be redrawn following the receipt of U.S. Census data, state legislatures can
conduct redistricting at any time.17
Typically, the state legislature in each state initiates redistricting.18 While the process
differs from state to state, many state legislatures create a committee of their own representatives
and senators to redraw the district maps. These committees generally consist of members of both
chambers of the state legislature and use the census data to update the districts accordingly.19
Once the maps are redrawn, the state legislature votes on the map and presents the new map to
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the governor for their approval.20 In general, the political party that is in the majority in the state
legislature is given an advantage in the redistricting process. This is because the majority party is
generally afforded the opportunity to have more control over the process and the makeup of any
committee if its party controls both the state legislature and the governorship.21
There are three primary techniques used when instituting a political gerrymander:
“packing,” “cracking,” and “tacking.”22 Typically, a combination of these techniques is used.
Packing occurs when the map is drawn to “pack” voters who are more likely to vote in a similar
manner into the same district.23 For example, in Ohio, packing was used to place as many
Democratic voters into the 9th District as permissible, in order to increase the percentage of
likely Republican voters in the other districts. Cracking occurs when the map is drawn to split an
area with a high number of residents who vote in a similar manner into several neighboring
districts.24 Cracking was used in Ohio's 9th District to split likely voters of Republican
candidates into districts surrounding the 9th District, to make those districts more likely to vote
for Republican candidates. Tacking occurs when a state legislature takes a portion of a district
with a particular demographic that they would like to include in the same district and draws that
demographic into the district to ensure a partisan majority.25 For example, a map could be
redrawn to include a tiny shape of a particular area. This is typically done to keep a specific
incumbent candidate’s home within the district that they are representing.26
There are two main types of gerrymandering claims that the Supreme Court has
previously considered: racial and political.27 Racial gerrymandering occurs when a district is
intentionally redrawn so that members of a particular race are placed together or split in such a
way to end up in the same district. The purpose of the district being redrawn in this manner is to
ensure that members grouped by a particular race vote for a particular candidate.28 Political
gerrymandering occurs when a district is redrawn so that members of a particular political party
are placed together or split into in the same district, discriminating against members of the
political party.29 This again results in the member representing that district being practically
assured of re-election due to their political affiliation with the majority party in the district.30
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has become more involved in political
gerrymandering. Starting with Davis v. Bandemer in 1986, the Supreme Court determined that
political gerrymandering cases were justiciable, which made such matters eligible to be heard by
federal courts.31 The Court observed that issues concerning political gerrymandering are issues
concerning representation and stated that, since the claim concerns electing representatives, “we
decline to hold that such claims are never justiciable.”32 However, while the Court in Davis ruled
20
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on the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims, it did not “draw a line in the sand” to
determine whether a district has been gerrymandered to the point that it violates the Constitution.
That is, the Court held off addressing what qualified as political gerrymandering and what did
not.33 In the decades since Davis, the Court continued to hear political gerrymandering cases that
violated different aspects of the Constitution, without establishing a specific uniform standard
that draws a clear line that determines whether a political gerrymander has “gone too far.”34 This
led to two separate claims brought by activists in two states: North Carolina and Maryland.
Rucho v. Common Cause
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished its ruling compared
to previous holdings, ruling that political gerrymandering is outside of the scope of federal
courts.35 The holding stemmed from two separate political gerrymandering claims concerning
congressional districts: one in North Carolina and the other in Maryland.36
North Carolina
In 2016, the North Carolina Republican Party initiated a mid-decade redistricting,
redrawing the congressional district map in the state.37 At the time the map was drawn,
Republicans held a majority of seats in the North Carolina Senate (34-16), and North Carolina
House of Representatives (74-45).38 As a result, Republicans had a stronger voice in conducting
the redistricting process in the state.39 To achieve this process, the North Carolina state
legislature created a redistricting committee that consisted of members of the state legislature,
chaired by members of the Republican party.40 This committee differs from an independent
commission because, in North Carolina, each member on the redistricting committee was a state
legislator appointed by the leaders of their respective parties to help draw the map.41 A total of
twenty-five Republicans and twelve Democrats were selected to serve on the committee.42 The
redistricting committee’ suggested map added a seat to the North Carolina Republican
congressional delegation.43 The map gave the North Carolina Republican Party, which held
control of the state legislature and, therefore, the power to draw the congressional district map, a
10-3 advantage in the state’s congressional delegation.44

33

Id. at 143.
See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S 947 (2004) (holding that Georgia’s redistricting plan violated the principle of one
person one vote); League of Latin-American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (holding that a Texas
redistricting plan was a political gerrymander, which violated the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment and
a racial gerrymander, which violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
35
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
36
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
37
Id.
38
2016 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/elections/Legis_Control_2016.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
39
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
40
Id.
41
Common Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 807.
42
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
43
Id.
44
Id. The co-chair of the redistricting committee stated that “I think electing Republicans is better than electing
Democrats. So, I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.” Id.
34

7

Common Cause (a non-profit organization), the North Carolina Democratic Party, and a
number of individual voters brought the suit against the chair of the redistricting committee and
other state officials alleging an unconstitutional political gerrymander.45 The Middle District of
North Carolina ruled that the redistricting constituted a partisan gerrymander and North Carolina
officials appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.46 While the court heard the allegations in
North Carolina in this matter, it was not the only instance of political gerrymandering that took
place during this time.
Maryland
Similar to North Carolina, following the 2010 census, Maryland Governor Martin
O’Malley established a redistricting committee consisting of Democratic state officials appointed
by the governor.47 The goal of this committee was to draw a new map that reduced the number of
likely Republican congressional districts to one district out of eight total districts.48 Specifically,
the committee focused on reducing the number of likely Republican voters in Maryland’s 6th
Congressional District, which had predominantly voted for Republican candidates for two
decades. The committee redrew the map in such a way that reduced the number of likely
Republican voters in Maryland’s 6th District by 24,000 and increased the number of likely
Democratic voters by 10,000.49 The committee's goal was successful; the election resulted in
seven Democratic congressional districts and one Republican congressional district.50
A group of Maryland voters residing in the 6th Congressional District brought suit
against the Maryland State Board of Elections, alleging that they were burdened by the map and
requesting that elections not be held under the map as drawn.51 The District Court of Maryland
ruled that the map was invalid, and must be redrawn prior to the 2020 general election, the
District Court’s ruling was challenged to the U.S. Supreme Court by the Maryland State Board
of Elections.52
The Court’s Ruling
Overruling the lower courts in both North Carolina and Maryland, the Court, in a 5-4
decision,53 ruled that political gerrymandering claims “present political questions beyond the
reach of federal courts.”54 This is because there was no legal standard that these courts could
apply to solve the problem, and no ability under the Constitution for courts to get involved in this
process, due to its highly political nature.55 This is because such rulings would result in the Court
making decisions on a highly political process that impacts the lives of every U.S. citizen.56
45
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Making this ruling could result in continued claims filed by citizens of states each time
redistricting takes place.57 The process of drawing the maps in both Maryland and North
Carolina is political, in that members of the state legislature are drawing maps that impact
political parties throughout the state. In doing so, the majority party, who has control of the
maps, is making decisions that impact the entire state. The Court made the decision that, due to
this process, they should not interfere.58
Solutions to the Problem
Although the Court determined that federal courts had no ability to hear political
gerrymandering claims, there were other means that could be used to solve political
gerrymandering matters. However, these solutions exist in a vacuum and there are pros and cons
to each of the approaches. Specifically, the court suggested congressional resolutions, which
would address not only gerrymandering, but the role courts have in the process as well. Other
solutions rely on states and state courts to conduct the process through one of three ways: (1)
state constitutional amendments, (2) ballot measures, and (3) independent commissions. The
most realistic solution for this problem is to have states resolve the issue through the use of
independent commissions, with limitations on the power that these commissions will have. This
section will first look at congressional proposals that will allow federal courts to hear
gerrymandering cases. Second, this section will look at state constitutional amendments as a
solution to the problem. Finally, this section will look at independent commissions as a solution
to the problem, including why the use of these commissions is the most realistic approach to
solving political gerrymandering issues.
Congressional Proposal for Federal Courts
While Rucho established that federal courts do not have a role in political
gerrymandering, Congress has the ability to grant federal courts the ability to “draw a line in the
sand” under Article III of the Constitution.59 In its opinion in Rucho, the Court recognized
congressional action as a potential solution to the problem of gerrymandering, noting H.R. 1 (the
For the People Act) as a potential solution.60 The proposed bill would establish a three-judge
panel consisting of judges located in the federal judicial district in which the state’s capital is
located.61 The panel would be established upon the event of any of the following “triggering
events”: (1) A state failing to establish a nonpartisan agency to draw their district maps (2) the
state failing to appoint a select committee on redistricting; (3) a state’s select committee on
redistricting failing to approve a selection pool of members in a timely fashion and (4) an
independent commission failing to approve a redistricting plan in a timely fashion.62
This bill provides triggers for federal courts to get involved in political gerrymandering
claims. Under this bill, federal courts would be able to resolve gerrymandering issues in their
states. This solution provides for strict requirements that must be met in order for courts to
intervene. Plaintiffs would be unable to continuously allege that a redistricted map violates their
constitutional rights. This is because there would be strict requirements that would have to be
57
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met before judicial involvement can take place. As a result, courts in these states would have the
ability to “draw a line in the sand” that the states in their district can follow in order to determine
whether a political gerrymander has gone too far in impacting their residents.
The bill has currently passed the United States House of Representatives and is presently
being considered by the United States Senate.63In order to be enacted, the bill must be passed by
both chambers of Congress and signed by the President. As a result, it will be difficult to see this
proposal come to fruition.
State Constitutional Amendments
A second option that the Court discussed in Rucho, as a way to address political
gerrymandering issues, was through state constitutional amendments.64 The Court cited four
examples of such amendments that are designed to limit the power that state legislatures have
when redrawing districts.65
This approach prohibits state legislatures from conducting political gerrymandering while
redistricting. However, the lack of courts’ ability to ensure that state legislatures are not violating
state constitutional amendments makes it difficult for such amendments to be effective in solving
the problem of gerrymandering. If a majority party that is drawing a map in the state legislature
still wants to protect incumbent candidates of their own party, they can do so by using other
methods besides partisan gerrymandering to ensure that their supported candidates win elections.
For example, a state legislature could relax other standards, such as compactness and contiguity
in an attempt to protect incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that lawsuits will continually arise
under the map because people will continue to feel like their voice is being limited, as was seen
in North Carolina and Maryland.66
Constitutional amendments will give state courts the ability to hear claims related to
redistricting under the state constitutions; however, based on a lawsuit in Florida, and the
response of the Florida Supreme Court, it is unlikely that they will present an ideal solution to
gerrymandering problems. Florida voters passed an amendment to their state constitution
prohibiting the Florida state legislature from drawing an apportionment plan with the intent of
helping or hurting a political party.67 A group of Florida voters brought suit in Florida Circuit
Court, alleging that the map as drawn violated the Florida constitutional amendment prohibiting
partisan redistricting.68 The ruling was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which found that
eight districts violated the Florida constitutional amendment and needed to be redrawn.69 While
the Florida Supreme Court did not order the entire map to be redrawn, it was ordered that the
eight districts violating the Florida constitution be redrawn.70 In its opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court observed that “this is neither the first, nor likely the last, time this court must confront a
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challenge to a redistricting plan enacted by the Legislature.”71 Based on this observation, state
courts will continue to hear lawsuits related to political gerrymandering under state statutes.
Independent Commissions
A third solution to political gerrymandering discussed in Rucho concerns independent
commissions. In the context of gerrymandering, independent commissions are bodies established
by an individual state to address gerrymandering issues. Generally, state legislatures appoint
members to serve on these commissions. These commissions serve in three unique ways: (1)
independent commissions, whose goal is to conduct redistricting, independent of their state
legislatures;72 (2) advisory commissions, which are not directly involved in drawing the map but,
instead, provide guidance to state legislatures;73 and (3) back-up commissions, which have the
power to draw maps only after the state legislature has been unsuccessful in doing so.74
How Commissions are Established
Independent commissions can be established in a number of different ways. First,
Congress can direct states to establish independent commissions to help resolve gerrymandering
issues through the passage of a bill. For example, in January 2021, The U.S. House of
Representatives reintroduced bill H.R. 1, the For the People Act of 2021.75 The bill requires all
states to conduct redistricting through the use of independent commissions, provided that there is
not an independent commission currently conducting the process.76 If states are currently using
independent commissions, they must meet certain requirements established in the bill.77 This
includes requirements for selection on the committee, as well as the way in which the
redistricting process is carried out.78
Independent commissions have also been established by state legislatures. For example,
in 1980, the Iowa state legislature passed a bill which established a process for drawing both
state legislative and congressional districts.79 This process transferred the redistricting process
from the state legislature to the Iowa Legislative Service Bureau, which later became the
Legislative Service Agency, an organization independent of the Iowa state legislature.80 The goal
of the state legislature in passing the bill was twofold.81 The first goal was to meet with members
of the public in order to obtain public input of the map and provide information about those

71
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meetings to the Iowa state legislature.82 The second goal was to provide guidance to members of
the state legislature on redistricting matters that are not clearly specified in Iowa state statutes.83
Third, independent commissions can be established through ballot measures. Under this
process, a measure is presented to residents of a particular state, who then vote to approve or
disprove the measure. For example, in 2018, Missouri voters signed a petition putting on the
ballot Amendment 1.84 A part of this amendment included the creation of a position called the
State Demographer, who was a neutral individual responsible for conducting redistricting.85 The
measure was approved by Missouri voters in November 2018.86 This individual was to be
responsible for drawing Missouri’s congressional and state legislative district maps, and for
sending them to the Missouri General Assembly for approval.87 Similar to Missouri, California
also used a ballot measure to establish their independent commission. Under the ballot measure
that was approved by voters in 2010, the state legislature was stripped of its ability to conduct
redistricting. Instead, the process was shifted to the Citizens Redistricting Commission, which
was responsible for completing the process.
Membership Makeup of Commissions
States use different methods to assign membership to independent commissions. For
example, Iowa’s legislative redistricting panel consists of five members.88 The majority and
minority parties in the Iowa state legislature each nominate two members, and the four
nominated members vote on the fifth member.89
In order to serve on the California redistricting commission, an applicant must meet
certain criteria. Applicants must have voted in two of the last three elections and must not have
previously served as a member of the California state legislature or as a lobbyist before the
California state legislature.90 Additionally, members must not have made a significant
contribution to a campaign of any California public official.91 The California State Auditor is in
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charge of reviewing applicants to ensure that they meet the requirements to serve on the
commission.92
H.R. 1 also proposes certain membership criteria for members of independent
commissions. Members are selected for the commission based on pools of candidates chosen
from three different groups. The first group will consist of members nominated by the political
party who won the most recent election for federal statewide office (the “majority” party).93 The
second pool will consist of members nominated by the political party who won the second most
votes in the most recent election for federal statewide office (the “minority” party).94 The final
pool will consist of members whose parties are not included in either of the first two categories.
In order to make the determination of which political party a nominee belongs to, the nominee
will be screened to determine their political background.95 If the candidate does not fit into either
the majority or minority party candidate pool, the candidate will be placed in the third pool.
Fifteen total members will be selected from each of the three individual groups to serve on this
redistricting commission, based two different timeframes.96
Process
The process for redistricting differs by state as well. This is dependent on the role that is
played by the commission in the process. The common theme among several independent
commissions is their solicitation and use of public comments regarding the redistricting process
and the final maps that are drawn.
When conducting redistricting, there are certain requirements that all states must meet.
First, under Article I of the Constitution, all districts in a state must have an equal population.97
Second, districts must comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This requires that states do
not discriminate against minority population groups.98
At the state level, districts must comply with requirements of geographical boundaries
and compactness.99 This is done by keeping cities, counties, and individual neighborhoods in the
same congressional district as much as possible.100 In California, it is required that when keeping
neighborhoods together, the commission must consider their social and economic interests, and
not any political relationship with an elected official or candidate.101 In Iowa, it is required that
districts not be of a particular shape when they are being drawn.102
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The work that the independent commissions perform differs by state. In Iowa, a
minimum of three public hearings must be held by the commission, and the commission must
summarize these meetings and provide the summary to the Iowa state legislature at the same
time as the final map.103 The Iowa legislature consists of two chambers, a state House of
Representatives and a state Senate. Following the submission of the summary of public
meetings, the state legislature has three days to consider the summary of the public meetings and
vote on the map.104 If the map is approved by one of the two chambers of the Iowa state
legislature, it must be expedited to a vote from the other chamber.105 Following the vote by the
second chamber, the map is presented to the Governor of Iowa to sign into law.106
If both chambers of the Iowa state legislature fail to pass the proposed plan, a second plan
must be drawn and considered by the state legislature within thirty-five days of the initial plan
being rejected.107 The second map must take into account the reasons provided by the rejecting
party.108 It is not a requirement that public input be sought with the second plan.109 If the second
plan fails, the process repeats a third time.110 As with the second plan, the map must be drawn to
correct the reasons why the previous map was rejected by the general assembly or governor,
however, no public input is required.111 If the Iowa state legislature cannot come to an agreement
after three redistricting attempts, the Iowa Supreme Court takes over the role of drawing the
map.112 If the state legislature does not approve the first map submitted by the Iowa Supreme
Court, the Iowa Supreme Court is given 90 days in order to draw a second map, which will be
considered the final map to be used in the next congressional election.113
California also requires that there be a particular process used when conducting
redistricting. Under the California constitution, it is required that when conducting redistricting,
the commission must engage in an “open and transparent process enabling full public
consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines.”114 Following the 2010 Census,
the commission first sought public comments from various groups in both support of and in
opposition to their political map, and members of the commission held public meetings
throughout the state in order to solicit public opinions on the map.115
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Like in Iowa, the California Supreme Court also has a role in the redistricting process.
In the event that the commission cannot come to a majority decision on the final map, the
California Supreme Court takes over the process.116 The California Supreme Court has the
authority to appoint a panel of three special masters to adjust the boundary lines in accordance
with the needed redistricting requirements.117 Once the California Supreme Court assumes
responsibility for the map, the panel of special masters draws the redistricted map without public
input and sends the final, certified map to the California Secretary of State.118
H.R. 1 also requires state commissions to follow a specific process in completing
redistricting. As a part of the process for drawing political maps, these commissions would be
required to hold at least two public hearings.119 The purpose of these meetings is to allow for
members of the public to comment on any proposed redistricting maps.120 Each commission
would be required to give the public notice prior to holding the meeting and will be allowed to
accept written maps from the public at these meetings.121 Additionally, the commissions will be
required to hold meetings at different locations throughout each state, so that members of the
public will not have to travel significant distances if they choose to comment on the issue.122
Once the map is finalized by the commission, the public will have thirty days to submit
comments on the redistricting plan.123 Following this period, the commission will then conduct a
vote on whether to approve the map, which will be held in a public meeting.124
The Best Solution
While it is difficult to find a solution that resolves all of the issues surrounding political
gerrymandering, the use of state advisory commissions, similar to what is used in Iowa, is the
best way to solve the issue. Each of the proposed solutions brings pros and cons that should be
considered when drawing an ideal gerrymandering model. While an argument could be made to
eliminate politics completely from gerrymandering, and have independent commissions do all of
the work, it is a proposition that will be very difficult to achieve. This is because the process
involves politicians and their jobs. As a result, politicians will want to have their own say in the
process. However, the use of independent commissions with members appointed by both the
majority and minority parties to advise state legislatures is an ideal solution to the problem. As is
the case in Iowa, it is also important for the members to (1) seek significant public input in order
to draw the map and (2) provide the input received by the public to the state legislature when
they present their map.125 Finally, it is significant to have a clear court, each individual state
supreme court, to present a solution to the problem, or to appoint a special master to resolve the
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problem in the event that the independent commission is unable to do so, (as is the case in
California).126
In selecting membership for independent commissions, it is important that the process be
as nonpartisan as possible. While there will always be a political aspect to the redistricting
process, it is important to ensure that those in charge of conducting the process are doing so
independently, with a commission composed of citizens selected after a dedicated state agency
reviews their political background, as in California.127 Doing so takes the control for selecting
commission members away from the state legislature, which will help to decrease the political
nature of the commission, and ultimately the process. It is also a good practice to have committee
members select the deciding vote in the process, as is the case in Iowa.128 This is because the
deciding vote is ultimately the key vote in the process, a vote that will be the determining factor
in whether the work done by the commission is ultimately successful. As a result, it makes sense
that members of the commission would have the ability to vote on the deciding member.
To ensure the neutrality of the commission, those who work closely with state
legislatures as lobbyist should not be permitted to serve on independent commissions, as in
California.129 This is because of the relationship that is developed between lobbyists and public
officials when they are working together. If a lobbyist is able to protect an elected official, it
becomes more likely that the official will help to promote policies important to the lobbyist or
donor after the redistricting is complete.
Commissions can also benefit by prohibiting former public officials from serving on a
commission following their term in office. In order to have districts drawn fairly using
population data, and not in a partisan manner, it is important for commissions to draw a map
without the influence of former state legislators. This is because, with their inclusion on these
commissions, it becomes likely that these former legislators could want to protect members of
their political parties with whom they were close. By excluding members of these groups, states
can ensure that members of these commissions are drawing the map to reflect accurate
redistricting, and not to secure seats for their own political party.
The process that is followed by independent redistricting commissions is also important.
Independent commissions should seek to have public hearings in order to solicit feedback from
those who will be impacted by the map, a process that is used in both Iowa and California.130
Some states draw the redistricted map without any input from the general public, which leads to
lawsuits from residents that are displeased with the map. To bring about better outcomes, the
state legislature must seek the participation of the general public in drawing the map.
Furthermore, soliciting public input can allow for different ideas and perspectives regarding the
maps to be presented. This will allow for a map that truly reflects the wishes of the electorate.
Following the solicitation of public comments, the independent commission should
conduct the redistricting process, taking into account both state and federal guidelines, to ensure
that all proper procedures are followed. Following this process, the independent commission
should present to the state legislature the results for their approval. As is the case in Iowa, when
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presenting these guidelines to state legislatures, independent commissions should also share a
summary of the public comments that were received.131 This is significant because, first, it will
ensure that the public’s voice is at least heard regarding the process. If there are issues regarding
a particular map that could impact the public, it is important for legislators to be aware of these
issues before voting to approve or deny them. Similarly, there should be a role for state courts to
play if the process is unable to be resolved. After three unsuccessful attempts, state supreme
courts should get involved by appointing a special master to assist with the process, similar to the
process in California.132 The appointment of a special master will ensure that the process is still
conducted by a third party, a step that is crucial to ensuring the independence of the process.
However, no solution is perfect, and this proposed process is not without issues. While
all states are required to use data provided by the census to draw maps proportionally, others,
such as North Carolina, relied on political data as well.133 While the use of data is significant, in
that it provides parties with the data needed to equally divide state populations, the use of certain
types of data, specifically electoral data, is problematic. This is because this data can be used to
protect incumbent candidates by drawing them into politically friendly districts. This could result
in multiple lawsuits filed against a map, as what happened in North Carolina.
Because states are required to use population data to conduct redistricting, eliminating
data completely is not an ideal solution to the problem. However, by eliminating the use of
political data as a part of the process, states can have a process that focuses more on these
requirements, and less on the official that is representing the individual districts. The
commissions may preserve their independence if they do not attempt to protect incumbents with
electoral data, similar to what happened in North Carolina.134 The removal of this data will result
in a process that is more politically neutral.
Conclusion
In Rucho, the Court determined that gerrymandering is not a matter to be resolved by
federal courts; however, the Court did suggest a number of solutions to solving the problem. This
process is best left to the states. While some states have passed amendments to their state
constitutions banning political gerrymandering, such amendments will result in continued
lawsuits. This leaves independent commissions as the best solution to the problem. In addition
to a congressional bill that would establish independent commissions, states also follow their
own procedures to create independent commissions. The process by which independent
commissions conduct the process is left to the states as well. The best solution is one in which
independent commissions conduct several public hearings, draw the updated map, and present
their findings to the state legislature for approval or rejection. If the process is unsuccessful, state
supreme courts should get involved to ensure that the process is conducted timely. Finally, the
process should include the lack of reliance on political data. By following these steps, states will
be able to conduct redistricting in accordance with requirements that are set by federal and state
regulations, and not one that is set by partisan protection.
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